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# INFORMATION REPORT

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1. Security Procedure: The ship was boarded in the outer harbor and a three hour search was conducted. The searching party consisted of about 30 Polish soldiers who carried side arms. All ship personnel had to remain in their cabins. No crew member accompanied the searchers. Searchers were polite and proper in their observance of military etiquette. The search was extensive, but could have been more so. Prior to departure, a five hour search was conducted. Radio silence was maintained all the time the ship was in port. Local authorities did not ask us to send back any ship movement reports after departure. While cargo was being worked, two soldiers were stationed at each crane, one ashore and one aboard ship, to insure that no one tried to ride the crane to sneak aboard the ship. We had heard that a crew member of a Swedish ship once was caught trying to smuggle his family aboard in a Polish port. As a result, the Chief Officer of the ship was put in a Polish prison for an unknown period.
2. Shore Liberty: After passport examinations, ship personnel were issued shore passes by local authorities; however only the Captain and several of the unlicensed personnel went ashore. These passes were shown to a guard at the gangway, but were retained by the person going ashore. Once ashore, ship personnel were at liberty to go unescorted anywhere they pleased about town. They were allowed to take only Polish money ashore and were allowed to bring none back. They were allowed, however, to bring aboard any purchases they made ashore.
3. Attitude of Longshoremen: The longshoremen seemed afraid to converse freely with ship personnel. Their working efficiency was good.
4. Port Facilities: Our ship berthed at Oreloading Depot, which is shown on US Hydrographic Office Chart #4928. Ore was discharged by means of large shovels on

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cranes of 5-6 tons lifting capacity. There were at least three of these shovels at the berth. Ore was discharged directly from the ship to railroad cars. There are three or four sets of railroad tracks on this wharf, but there are no warehouses. The other side of the dock is still used for coal handling, as indicated in US Hydrographic Office Chart #4928. In the port, rubble from bomb damage had been cleaned up, but no reconstruction seemed to have been done. No large construction of any sort was observed in progress.

5. Port Activity: There were some small foreign and domestic ships in the port, but no other large oceangoing ships were observed. No naval ships or aircraft of any sort were observed.
6. Discharge of Cargo for Czechoslovakia: While at Gdansk, 26-28 Dec 53, we unloaded a quantity of iron ore, destined ultimately for Czechoslovakia. This ore was loaded at Madras, India 28-30 Oct 53, and originally was to have been discharged at Hamburg for Czechoslovakia. What prompted the change in plans I do not know.

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